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Abstract: This article examines the channelization of 
radicalism by fundamentalist-religious organizations among 
Muslim university students in Indonesia. The data are taken 
from 700 Muslim students’ respondents in seven Indonesian 
universities. This study finds that the channelization of radical-
religious ideology in Indonesia takes place via new media with 
three layers of channels: open-public channel, restricted-public 
channel, and private channel. The first channel, which is 
relatively public and overt media platforms, is used to 
communicate and launch their messages, as well as to expand 
their ideological propaganda. The second channel, which 
includes some public but relatively closed media platforms, is 
used by radical-religious organizations in Indonesia to recruit 
their new members. By the third channel, a more closed and 
private media platform becomes the final channel to select new 
cadres. This research finding is expected to be a 
complementary reference for the de-radicalization processes 
that are disseminated via new media to young Muslims and 
university students in Indonesia. 
Keywords: Channelization strategy, Muslim university 
students, radicalism, new media. 
Introduction 
Since the last two decades, radical Islamist groups in Indonesia 
have begun to target young people and university students by utilizing 
new media technologies.1 These new media platforms, especially social 
                                                                
1 Birgit Bräuchler, “Islamic Radicalism Online: The Moluccan Mission of the Laskar 
Jihad in Cyberspace,” Australian Journal of Anthropology 15, no. 3 (2004): 267–285; Bonan 
Dolok Oktavianus Siagian and Arwin D.W. Sumari, “Radicalism Discourse Analysis 
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media, are used by the Islamist groups to spread religious radical 
ideologies and propagate their doctrines as well as to explore and 
recruit potential cadres, and even to voice jihad against the legitimate 
government.2 A number of Islamic organizations in Indonesia that are 
suspected of being radical3 such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI, the 
Indonesian Liberation Party), Front Pembela Islam (FPI, Islamic 
Defenders Front), Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia 
(KAMMI, the Indonesian Muslim Student Action Unit), Jamaah 
Ansharud Daulah (JAD, the State Supporters Group), Harakah 
Tarbiyah (the Tarbiyah Movement), and the Salafi Jamaah, are also 
reportedly developing what is called “social media jihad” among young 
Muslims by utilizing a number of new media platforms.4 The use of 
the new media platforms as the strategy of spreading religious radical 
ideology has now taken place in a much more systematic, structured 
and goal-oriented way. 
Primarily, new media platforms–especially social media–are 
currently widely used by hardline Islamic groups in Indonesia to 
communicate and spread ideological messages as well as to recruit and 
select new cadres of youths and university students. The choice to use 
social media makes sense since young people and students are the 
                                                                                                                                      
“The Internet in Indonesia: Development and Impact of Radical Websites,” Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism 33, no. 2 (2010): 171–191; Nurdin, “Radicalism on World Wide 
Web and Propaganda Strategy,” Al-Ulum 16, no. 2 (2016), 265. 
2 Anne Aly et al., “Introduction to the Special Issue: Terrorist Online Propaganda and 
Radicalization,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 40, no. 1 (2017): 1–9;  Ali Fisher, 
“Swarmcast: How Jihadist Networks Maintain a Persistent Online Presence,” 
Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no. 3 (2015); Jytte Klausen et al., “The YouTube Jihadists: A 
Social Network Analysis of Al-Muhajiroun’s Propaganda Campaign,” Perspectives on 
Terrorism 6, no. 1 (2012); Martin Rudner, “‘Electronic Jihad’: The Internet as Al 
Qaeda’s Catalyst for Global Terror,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 40, no. 1 (2017): 
10–23; Robin Thompson, “Radicalization and the Use of Social Media,” Journal of 
Strategic Security 4, no. 4 (2011): 167–190. 
3 Muhammad Wildan, “The Nature of Radical Islamic Groups in Solo,” Journal of 
Indonesian Islam 7, no. 1 (2013): 49–70. 
4 Asep M. Iqbal, “Internet, Identity and Islamic Movements: The Case of Salafism in 
Indonesia,” Islamika Indonesiana 1, no. 1 (2014), 81; Nafi Muthohirin, “Radikalisme 
Islam Dan Pergerakannya Di Media Sosial,” Afkaruna 11, no. 2 (2015): 240–259; 
Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman, “Reviving the Caliphate in the Nusantara: 
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia’s Mobilization Strategy and Its Impact in Indonesia,” Terrorism 
and Political Violence 22, no. 4 (2010): 601–622; Syamsul Rijal, “Crafting Hizbiyyin in 
Contemporary Indonesia: Da’wah and Recruitment of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia in 
South Sulawesi,” Journal of Indonesian Islam 5, no. 1 (2011): 130–152,. 
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biggest users of social media in Indonesia today. A number of social 
media that are commonly exploited by radical Islamic groups in 
Indonesia include Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Line, WhatsApp, and 
Telegram. Interestingly. Members then can duplicate these social media 
platforms for further campaign of their radical religious ideologies. The 
so-called “channelization strategy” in using social media is the key to 
the process of spreading ideology and recruitment of new cadres to 
radical Islamic groups in Indonesia today. 
This article describes the attempt of radical-religious Islamist 
groups to develop a channelization strategy to recruit potential cadres 
who can be relied upon in the dissemination of Islamic ideology 
among Muslim students in Indonesia. This screening-like system is 
perceived as a channelization effort developed as a part of the 
recruitment method and an attempt to launch their messages and 
expand their propaganda to the younger people, particularly students. 
The data presented in this article is based on the result of field research 
carried out in seven public universities in Indonesia that have been 
suspected by BNPT (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, 
National Anti Terrorism Board) of being infiltrated by radical Islamic 
ideology: the University of Indonesia, Bogor Agricultural University, 
Bandung Institute of Technology, Diponegoro University, Airlangga 
University, the Ten November Institute of Technology, and Brawijaya 
University.5 
The main question is: what and how new media channels and 
platforms have been used by the radical-religious groups in Indonesia 
to disseminate their ideology and to recruit new members? It is 
important to discuss this question further as what we have seen in the 
last five years that there have been indications of the increasing spread 
of radical ideology among Muslim students in Indonesia.  
This study uses a mixed method,6 combining quantitative and 
qualitative kinds. The quantitative method is used for two purposes: 
first, to obtain an initial overview of the phenomenon of the 
channelization of radical ideology among Muslim university students in 
Indonesia, and second, to obtain general data about the process of 
channeling radical ideologies in the aforementioned seven universities. 
                                                                
5 See https://kabar24.bisnis.com/read/20180531/255/801534/daftar-7-kampus-top-
di-indonesia-terpapar-radikalisme 
6 Max Weber, Edward A. Shils, and Henry A. Finch, The Methodology of the Social Sciences 
(New York: Free Press, 1997). 
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However, samples in this study are taken purposively, with the aim to 
understand the processes and strategies for spreading religious radical 
ideology among Muslim university students in Indonesia.  
The qualitative method is used to obtain in-depth data on the 
forms of radical ideological channelization practices among Muslim 
university students in Indonesia. Field research and data collection 
processes, both quantitatively and qualitatively, were carried out in the 
period of August-November 2018. The quantitative method is used to 
map the general conditions of the phenomenon of the spread of 
radical ideology among Muslim university students in Indonesia. There 
are in total 700 Muslim students as the respondents, with details of 100 
Muslim students from each campus who have been exposed to radical 
ideology.  
Religion, Radicalism, and Media  
Since 2005, there has been a phenomenon in Indonesia that Greg 
Fealy referred to as “conservative turn” in the religious life of 
Indonesian Muslims.7 Referring to Fealy’s terminology, a conservative 
turn is a phenomenon of the increasing interpretation of religious 
understanding that is timid, puritanical and intolerant. The popular 
images of Muslims in Indonesia, who were previously known as 
moderate, friendly, tolerant, and open, have turned to become 
conservative, closed, prejudiced, and radical.8 Even, two of the largest 
Islamic organizations in Indonesia: Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and 
Muhammadiyah, now seem somewhat marginalized and face a 
decrease in popularity.9 
                                                                
7 Greg Fealey, “A Conservative Turn: Liberal Islamic Groups Have Prompted a 
Backlash,” Inside Indonesia 87 (2006): 35–52; Kikue Hamayotsu, “Conservative Turn? 
Religion, State and Conflict in Indonesia,” Pacific Affairs 87, no. 4 (2014). 
8 Vedi R Hadiz, “Towards a Sociological Understanding of Islamic Radicalism in 
Indonesia,” Journal of Contemporary Asia (2008): 37–41; Marteen van Bruinessen, 
What Happened to the Smiling Face of Indonesian Islam?: Muslim Intellectualism and 
the Conservative Turn in Post-Suharto Indonesia, 2011; Fealey, “A Conservative 
Turn,”; Hamayotsu, “Conservative Turn?” 
9 Martin Van Bruinessen, “Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto 
Indonesia 1,” South East Asia Research (2002): 117–154; Minako Sakai and Amelia 
Fauzia, “Islamic Orientations in Contemporary Indonesia : Islamism on the Rise ?,” 
Asian Ethnicity, no. November 2014 (2014): 37–41; Bruinessen, What Happened to the 
Smiling Face of Indonesian Islam?: Muslim Intellectualism and the Conservative Turn in Post-
Suharto Indonesia. 
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The development of communication and information technology, 
ironically, does not change the reality of conservatism among the 
Muslim communities in Indonesia. Indeed, there is a strong 
connection between the growth in communication technologies and 
the phenomenon of a conservative turn in Indonesia and how the 
growth in technologies heavily influenced the rise of that 
phenomenon. The spread of a conservative and radical-religious 
ideology that was previously carried out offline (through traditional 
magazines, bulletins, leaflets) have now incorporated the use of new 
media (through various types of new media, especially social media). 
This shift is apparently in line with the increased use of new media by 
global radical-religious organizations all over the world.10 
Since the late 1990s and early 2000s, a number of transnational 
terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and ISIS have used blogs, 
pages, forums and social media (Facebook, Twitter and YouTube) as 
the spearhead of their “media jihadi” to the world.11 Among the 
earliest attempts by Islamic radical groups to make use of the internet 
was Azzam.com, a page created by a Muslim student at Imperial 
College, London in 1997. Since then, this page has been copied and 
referred to as an example by other Islamic radical groups to encourage 
their followers to create or produce similar pages.12 The significant 
increase of Internet users becomes the main cause of the rapid shift in 
methods and strategies done by radical-religious organizations globally. 
The use of new media as a strategy for spreading radical-religious 
ideology includes four aspects of interest, namely as a means of 
coordination between members, as a media tool for ideological 
propaganda, as a way to recruit new members and as a way to ‘train’ 
new members.13 As part of changes in the strategy of using the media 
more broadly, new media such as Facebook, Telegram, and YouTube 
                                                                
10 John Curtis Amble, “Studies in Conflict & Terrorism Combating Terrorism in the 
New Media Environment,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (2012): 37–41; Maura 
Conway, “Determining the Role of the Internet in Violent Extremism and Terrorism : 
Six Suggestions for Progressing Research,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (2016); Martin 
Rudner, “‘Electronic Jihad’: The Internet as Al-Qaeda ’ s Catalyst for Global Terror,” 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (2016). 
11 James P Farwell, “The Media Strategy of ISIS,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 56, 
no. 6 (2014): 37–41. 
12 Amble, “Studies in Conflict & Terrorism Combating Terrorism in the New Media 
Environment.” 
13 Ibid.; Farwell, “The Media Strategy of ISIS.” 
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have succeeded in radically transforming the method of radical-
religious ideology propaganda.14  
An interesting study by Bloom and Daymon15 proposes that the 
dissemination process through new media platforms does not occur in 
a single and integrated manner, clarifying that one-third of ISIS’ 
propaganda and messages in social media consisted of a positive and 
constructive idea of the Islamic Caliphate. According to them, through 
social media, ISIS adopts a strategy to spread their propaganda by 
aiming their ideological messages at various groups. By producing 
different propaganda materials for a different audience, ISIS believes 
that audience may find their message useful and inspiring by each 
audience’s level of faith and understanding about Islam. However, 
once audiences find themselves involved in the organization, a single 
doctrinal similarity about absolute loyalty to each of its members 
appears strong, and violence as a way to achieve the goal of the 
establishment of Islamic Caliphate tends to be enforced.16 
A number of previous studies have discussed the crucial role of the 
new media as a means of spreading radical-religious ideology by 
emphasizing the types of new media along with itsadvantages in 
disseminating this radical-religious ideology.17 What seems to be 
inadequate from the previous studies is the assumption that users of 
new media tend to be passive, receiving any available information from 
those media platforms, no more than consuming radical-religious 
ideology. However, the facts have shown that there are a number of 
                                                                
14 See Anne Aly, “Brothers , Believers , Brave Mujahideen : Focusing Attention on the 
Audience of Violent Jihadist Preachers,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (2016).; Andre, 
“‘Neojihadism’ and YouTube: Patani Militant Propaganda Dissemination and 
Radicalization ‘Neojihadism’,” Asian Security (2012): 37–41; Rudner, “‘Electronic Jihad’: 
The Internet as Al-Qaeda ’ s Catalyst for Global Terror.” 
15 Mia Bloom and Chelsea Daymon, “Assessing the Future Threat: ISIS’s Virtual 
Caliphate,” Foreign Policy Research Institute (2018): 372–388. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Conway, “Determining the Role of the Internet”; Aly, “Brothers, Believers, Brave 
Mujahideen”; Andre, “‘Neojihadism’ and YouTube”; Klausen, “Tweeting the Jihad: 
Social Media Networks of Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq,” Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism (2015); Hara and Stevens, “Echo Chambers and Online Radicalism: 
Assessing the Internet’s Complicity in Violent Extremism,” Policy & Internet 7, no. 4 
(2015): 401–422; Hew Wai Weng, “The Art of Dakwah: Social Media, Visual 
Persuasion and the Islamist Propagation of Felix Siauw and the Islamist Propagation 
of Felix Siauw,” Indonesia and the Malay World 46, 134 (2018): 61–79. 
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new media users who actively disseminate, produce, and reproduce 
those radical messages through the cyberspace. In addition, previous 
studies have not yet discussed the patterns, strategies, and methods of 
using the new media to spread that radical-religious ideology. 
Moreover, there has not been any research and explanation on whether 
the process of disseminating radical-religious ideology in Indonesia 
takes place in a single and integrated manner or heterogeneous and 
diffused.  
This study attempts to fill in the gap in the literature surrounding 
the issue of religion, radicalism and the use of media by proposing an 
argument that the dissemination process of radical religious ideology in 
the new media among Muslim students in Indonesia takes place 
systematically and in a structured way through a process which can be 
called ‘channelization of ideology.’ 
New Media and the Dissemination of Radicalism  
Several Islamic radical-religious organizations in Indonesia such as 
HTI, KAMMI, JAD, FPI, and small salaf and tarbiyah groups rely 
upon communication and information technology to spread their 
propaganda messages to students. They disseminate those messages 
through a wide variety of new media platforms such as blogs, vlogs, 
official organization pages, supporting pages, and numerous social 
media and messaging platforms (Facebook, Instagram, Telegram, 
Twitter, YouTube, WhatsApp, Line) (see  Figure 1). 
There are some benefits of using new media platforms as a means 
of spreading radical-religious ideology and propaganda messages 
among students in Indonesia. First, easily accessible through mobile 
phones and laptop with available Internet connection. Second, highly 
interactive, as students heavily rely on social media to interact with 
other people. Third, targeting the right consumers, as students spend 
huge amount of their time on social media. Fourth, relatively 
inexpensive, compared to other media such as magazines, brochures, 
leaflets or newspapers. Fifth, interlinked, allowing the spread of 
radical-religious ideology to take place more effectively and optimally. 
Sixth, easy to analyze, because, with online data available, analysis can 
be carried out to achieve the goal of disseminating radical-religious 
ideology more accurately.  
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Figure 1. Examples of the Spread of Radical Ideology through New Media 
A popular Muslim figure, notoriously known for transmitting 
radical Islamic ideology in Indonesia is Felix Siauw, whose belief and 
perception is associated with HTI. He relies on social media 
(Instagram, Twitter, and Facebook) to deliver religious messages 
targeting Muslim youth and students.18 A number of other ustadzs who 
                                                                
18 Weng, “The Art of Dakwah.” 
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are associated with preaching radical Islamic ideology such as Khalid 
Basalamah, Riza Basalamah, Syafiq Reza, Subhan Bawazier, Salim 
Fillah, also utilize social media to spread their ideological narratives 
about the importance of shari’ah law, the total Islam, Islamic state, and 
Caliphate enforcement in Indonesia.  
Table 1. Followers of Usta>dz on Social Media 
List of Ustadz Percentage of Followers 
Felix Siauw 35,1% 
Zakir Naik 18,1% 
Rizieq Shihab  15,7% 
Bachtiar Nasir 2,6% 
Abu Bakar Ba’asyir 2,1% 
Tengku Zulkarnain 1,6% 
Khalid Basalamah 0,7% 
Riza Basalamah 0,7% 
Syafiq Reza  0,7% 
Salim Fillah 0,7% 
Subhan Bawazier 0,7% 
Not following at all 21% 
Based on the quantitative study conducted, 700 students suggest 
that Siauw is one of the most popular Muslim public figures, who has a 
considerable number of students as his followers on social media 
(35.1%) (see table 1). Zakir Naik, an Indian Islamic preacher, has 
become the second most popular Muslim figure on social media 
among Indonesia Muslim students (18.1%). Other radical Muslim 
figures such as Rizieq Shihab (15.7%), Bachtiar Nasir (2.6%), Abu 
Bakar Ba'asyir (2.1%) and Tengku Zulkarnain (1.6%) are also popular 
among Muslim students in Indonesia and known to have a vast 
number of followers on social media. Dennis, a student of Airlangga 
University, explains the reason why he becomes a social media 
follower of Siauw: 
“I followed Ustadz Siauw’s Instagram account because I think he’s 
a cool guy. I know he was previously a non-Muslim, and he is 
currently a mu’allaf (a person converted to Islam), so technically 
he’s new to this whole Islam thing. But what amazes me is that he 
knows literally different things about Islam, even exceeding other 
Muslims who were born into a strict Islamic background. He can 
preach and educate other Muslims. So, I think he’s great. His 
books are also great. Sometimes I like to repost his Facebook 
postings on my timeline. Learning about Islam could be from 
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anywhere. Through social media, da‘wah websites and accounts, 
and so much more. We can seek that knowledge easily and I could 
easily relate it to myself.” 
Siauw is an Indonesian Muslim preacher of Chinese descent and is 
known to be affiliated with the transnational Islamist movement, 
HTI19 Siauw’s method of preaching is popular among young people, 
especially students since he utilizes social media and visual aesthetics in 
the way he preaches, which attract more youth. With his popular 
method of preaching, Siauw has managed to gain considerable number 
of social media followers: four million on Facebook, two million on 
Twitter, one million on Instagram, and twenty thousand on YouTube. 
His da’wah approach is quite persuasive and compelling. However, at 
the same time, Siauw’s da’wah style, contents and messages are deemed 
to be controversial as he has been accused of promoting transnational 
Caliphate and undermining Pancasila.  
Table 2. Types of Social Media and the Dissemination of Radicalism 
Types of Social Media Percentage of Users 






The use of new media, especially social media, as the primary 
platform for the dissemination of radical-religious ideology among 
Muslim students in Indonesia is in line with the global trend of shifting 
patterns and strategies for spreading radicalism.20 The new media is 
perceived as having advantages over traditional-conventional media, -
such as magazines, newspapers, television, and radio as a means of 
transmitting radical ideas in Indonesia.21  
                                                                
19 Ibid. 
20 Cristina Archetti, “Terrorism, Communication and New Media: Explaining 
Radicalization in the Digital Age,” Perspectives on terrorism 9, no. 1 (2015): 49–59; 
Anne Aly et al., “Introduction to the Special Issu : Terrorist Online Propaganda and 
Radicalization,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (2016); Amble, “Combating Terrorism in 
the New Media Environment”; Conway, “Determining the Role of the Internet”; Aly, 
“Brothers, Believers, Brave Mujahideen.” 
21 Martin Van Bruinessen, Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the 
“Conservative Turn” (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2013). 
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Social media plays a crucial role in the process of spreading 
radicalism to Muslim students in Indonesia (see Table 2). Among the 
various forms of social media available, Instagram (50.9%), WhatsApp 
(22.3%) and Twitter (17.9%) rank highest as the new media most 
widely used by students in accessing radical contents. For the following 
rank, there are Facebook, YouTube, and Telegram used as a media for 
the dissemination of radicalism to Muslim students in Indonesia. 
Instagram in particular, as suggested above, is the most popular 
social media platform among Muslim students in Indonesia who have 
been actively joining radical-religious groups on social media (9.4%) 
(see Table 3). Another social media platform that is widely used to 
access and obtain contents about radicalism of Islam are Line (7.3%), 
Facebook (5.4%), Chatroom (4.1%), Snapchat (1.4%) and Twitter 
(0.4%). 
Table 3. Signing Up & Joining in Radical Religious Groups on Social Media 
Social Media Actively Use Non-actively Use Never Use 
Instagram 9,4% 13,3% 77,3% 
Line 7,3% 3,3% 89,4% 
Facebook 5,4% 17,1% 77,5% 
Chatroom 4,1% 2,9% 93% 
Snapchat 1.4% 1,4% 97,2% 
Twitter 0,4% 2,1% 97,5% 
As part of the net generation, or often referred to as digital natives, 
students have grown up using technology and thus fully versed in the 
world of bits and bytes. In comparison, the previous generation (baby 
boomers), who are still having a hard time adjusting to modern 
technology, rely more on face-to-face interactions and would prefer to 
access information through the print media. 
Channelization and the Proliferation of Radicalism 
Through the activities of study and lectures, students who become 
members of radical Islamic organizations have been socialized to 
believe and support the Islamic Caliphate. Not only through face-to-
face interactions, the strategies of disseminating radical-religious 
ideology and the process of recruiting new members also rely heavily 
on social media through channelization strategies. Channelization 
refers to a strategy of creating and directing channels in a structured 
manner to spread ideology and propaganda messages through various 
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new media platforms, such as blogs, vlogs, organization websites and 
social media.  
Rina, a student of Bogor Agricultural University who is also a 
respondent of this research, explains how the channelization of 
information has been already enforced since the beginning as an effort 
to introduce radical-religious organizations in her university: 
“So, it’s like we all have to go through this filtering system. We are 
not allowed to ask too many questions. And of course, when we 
first join in, we must do as we are told. Even when it comes to the 
reading materials. We couldn’t just read whatever we want. Like 
me for example, I just joined in, so I had to read these books 
meant for beginners only. I was not allowed to read books with 
more advanced materials. So, what we can read is really limited 
and structured. Also, for websites, we are not allowed to read 
from whatever sources we can find.”  
Syam, another student of Airlangga University, mentions how the 
organizations are limiting materials they could consume: 
“Once we join in the Qur’anic studies sessions, we are not allowed 
to access or read information from whichever source we can find. 
I remember one of the girls from my Islamic group said that the 
ustadz had been telling them the danger of accessing information 
from the Internet. We have to be highly selective and protective 
of ourselves from those inappropriate contents. They also gave us 
some guidance to which sites are appropriate.” 
The channelization process of spreading radicalism in Indonesia 
takes place through three channels: open-public channel (K-1), 
restricted-public channel (K-2), and private channel (K-3) (see Table 
4). Open-public channel (K-1) refers to the early and initial channel for 
the dissemination of radical-religious ideology and the spread of 
Islamic propaganda. It is carried out through popular Islamic social 
media websites and social media accounts of Islamic public figures 
who provide religious information affiliated with several religious 
organizations in Indonesia. 
The first channel is effective in spreading the message of Islam. Its 
nature is meant to deliver Islamic contents in a more interactive and 
efficient way, and to increase the scalability of reach among Muslim 
students. Briefly, this first channel is usually similar to other da’wah 
sites or social media accounts with its contents and approach tending 
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to be neutral, engaging, and not explicitly displaying the attributes of 
radical-religious organizations.  
Table 4. Channelization Strategy to Disseminate Radical Ideology  








































































cer of media 
content and 
information 
ITS’s WhatsApp group 
chat, UI’s student 
telegram group 
Another typical feature of the dissemination of radicalism through 
the first channel is the presence of a Q&A section that allows students 
to ask, and share any information related to general religious issues. 
Further, in the same section, students are provided with links to the 
official pages of organizations and websites or social media to discuss 
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further those issues. Students who are given access to the first channel 
of dissemination strategy mostly only take part as information 
consumers, instead of producers or a combination of both. The 
excerpt from Dila, a student of Bogor Agricultural University, below is 
so illustrative:  
“I think I tend to access information through websites because I 
feel like Qur’anic study groups are not enough. And I also don’t 
have time to go. So, websites are my go-to for more information. 
Some of the websites I like are konsultasiSyariah.com or 
parentingNabawiyah.com. I also follow some official da‘wa 
accounts at Line.” 
Azhar, a student of Brawijaya University, suggests a similar 
argument: 
“Those ustadzs on social media are pretty amazing to be honest 
and plus I don’t feel the need to go to the Qur’anic study group 
anymore. Those contents on social media has provided me with 
plenty of information. My friends and I, we prefer to watch videos 
on YouTube rather than going to the study group. It’s much more 
flexible I guess”. 
The main purpose of the first channel is to provide students who 
have recently joined or who are eager to learn more general 
information about Islam. Examples of media platforms of the first 
channel are ConsultationSyariah.com, ParentingNabawiyah.com, 
Muslim.or.id, MuslimAfiyah.com, while those of Instagram accounts 
include @muslimahID, @fiqihwanita, Instagram accounts of Islamic 
public figures such as @hawariyyun, @muzammilhb, @ariekuntung, 
@teukuwisnu, just as those of YouTube channels are Muslimah Media 
Center (MMC) and Yuk Ngaji, or Teleskrin.  
Restricted-public channel (K-2) refers to the dissemination of 
radicalism carried out through either the official websites or 
organizations, or other websites affiliated with radical-religious 
organizations or official social media sites that provide further 
information on radical-religious organizations. In contrast to the first 
channel, media platforms in the second channel feature appear to have 
less neutral contents and approach and tend to provide more specific 
information about the ideology of those radical-religious organizations. 
Most of the students who access media contents within the second 
channel are not typical newcomers. However, those students are 
indeed already curious and eager to learn more about the ideology and 
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significance of certain radical-religious organizations. Within this 
channel, students do not only take part as consumers of information, 
but also play a role as producers of contents by disseminating 
information, posting memes, or forming social media groups. A 
number of religious public figures who are relatively popular among 
students within the second channel are Siauw, Khalid Basalamah, Riza 
Basalamah, Reza, Bawazier, and Fillah. Most media platforms in the 
second channel tend to administer exclusivity –providing closed social 
media groups for students who are genuinely interested in learning 
more about those radical-religious organizations.  
The purpose of the second channel is to provide more specific and 
in-depth information about the ideology and perception of certain 
radical-religious organizations. Examples of second channel media 
platforms are the official website of organizations such as HTI, FPI, 
KAMMI, Gema Pembebasan IPB, or the public pages affiliated with 
other radical-religious organizations such as MediaUmat.com, 
EraMuslim .com, Rumaysho.com DakwahMedia.net, Arrahmah.com, 
NahiMunkar.com, MediaOposisi.com, Hidayatullah.com, 
VOAIslam.com, WA group and Line TarbiyahSunnah, the official 
Twitter account of HTI, FPI or Instagram account including 
@indonesiabertauhid, @mediaumat, @bkimipb, or 
@mercusuar_umat. Mutiara, a student of Bogor Agricultural 
University, mentions:  
“I very much prefer browsing through information online. Usually 
through WhatsApp or Line group, or straight to their official 
websites. Because on social media, it’s likely that we’ll encounter 
hoax and other misleading information. My ustadz also reminds us 
of reading materials through sites that have been approved by the 
organization. I don’t think we’re really allowed to access other 
sites. He said it’s bid’ah [unwarranted religious innovation]. So, I 
think it’s better just to access those information from the 
approved websites or even ask any experts straight away on the 
chat groups. If you’ve heard of “Tarbiyah Sunnah,“ or websites 
called Rumaysho.com, DahwahMedia.net.? On those sites, we can 
also do an online consultation since there’s this online Q&A 
feature that site provides us. It’s simply making things so much 
easier.” 
Through the Q&A feature, those organizations are then able to 
observe and discover curious students who potentially make the 
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perfect candidate to join private and close groups within the third 
channel.  
Private channel (or K-3) is the channel for the dissemination of 
radical-religious ideology that is carried out through closed social 
media groups, especially WhatsApp or Line groups or telegram. Within 
the same channel, the process of recruiting new members also occurs. 
In contrast to media platforms within the first and second channel, the 
third channel does not incorporate various media platforms, as they 
tend to be more limited and disclosed. Through closed and private 
social media groups, the process of channelization and spreading 
radical-religious ideologies can occur more effectively. Below are 
excerpts from students who are members of closed social media 
groups: 
“We have this WhatsApp group and only a specific number of 
people can join in. We also have a more public Qur’anic study 
group itself though but not everyone is a member of HTI. But this 
group I mentioned before, we coordinate, and we run things 
together. Each has their role. So, in this group, we have darisah, 
musrifah and other admin people” (Rin, a student of the Ten 
November Institute of Technology). 
“I’m a member of this telegram group because my friend gave me 
an exclusive group invite. Without the invitation, I wouldn’t be 
able to join in. This is a very private closed up, only for UI” (Jani, 
a student of the University of Indonesia). 
The closed social media groups in the third channel consist of 
students who have gone through the process of ‘filtering’ within the 
first and second channels. Those who are deemed suitable to join the 
radical-religious organizations should have certain characteristics. 
Within this closed social media groups, students who had been 
exposed to propaganda messages and had embraced the radical 
religious ideology are encouraged to exchange and discuss information 
with other members in a secretive manner. The processes of 
exchanging information can lead to the dissemination of radical-
religious ideology that is solid and structured. It is also common that 
most students who have access to media platforms in the third channel 
produce and spread propaganda messages and radical-religious 
ideology through their creation of meme. 
The aim of the third channel in addition to screening new cadres 
and recruiting new members, it is also used as a channel to provide 
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more in-depth information about the ideology of radical-religious 
organizations. Examples of media platforms within the third channel 
are the closed telegram group of the JAD which consist of students of 
the University of Indonesia or members of closed WhatsApp group of 
students oft the Ten November Institute of Technologywho are 
associated with HTI organization. Because it is exclusive, closed, and 
private, within the third channel, not everyone can participate in the 
selected media platforms. Only those who had gone through the 
screening processes as members can join in.  
The strategy of developing the channelization of ideology aims to 
use new media platforms to describe the Islamic State as a land that is 
full of happiness to recruit supporters. Within the third channel that is 
more, private, and personal, these organizations believe that the 
strategy is more effective in persuading the younger people. By 
implementing the channelization strategy to students, the primary goal 
is to enforce a more militant and radical belief to young people. Hence, 
students have become prosumer of information who actively consume 
while producing radical contents as part of the act of Jihad that they 
believe is appropriate and justified. 
The Channelization Strategy Model of Radicalism through New Media  
The dissemination of radical-religious ideology among Muslim 
students in Indonesia via new media is a logical consequence of the 
change in the character of society, from modern society to postmodern 
internet-based and AI-based society that is dominated by consumption 
activities emphasizing effectiveness and efficiency.22 This postmodern 
society is also more democratic and open, and does not acknowledge 
absolute power. In this context, the high penetration of internet and 
social media in Indonesia is the focus. The vast number of social media 
users in Indonesia, especially from young people and students, is 
targeted by radical-religious organizations to distribute their ideology 
and influence. 
In general, the process of spreading radical-religious ideology via 
new media is an extension of the same process using traditional-
conventional media. This is in line with the argument of Marshall 
McLuhan, which has reminded that technological developments will be 
                                                                
22 Kikue Hamayotsu, “Beyond Faith and Identity : Mobilizing Islamic Youth in a 
Democratic Indonesia,” The Pacific Review 24, no. 2 (2011): 225–247. 
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a solution to human physical limitations.23The communication channel 
in the dissemination of radical-religious ideologies has changed from 
traditional communication channels (television, radio, newspapers, 
magazines, brochures) to new media (websites, blogs, video blogs, and 
social media). The new media now play an important role as the 
primary communication channel used by producers of radical-religious 
ideologies to expand their influence on Muslim students in Indonesia. 
Social media are more effective and massive as an instrument for 
disseminating radical ideas. The dissemination using social media is 
also faster as well as more interactive and widespread. 
The channelization strategy in the process of transmitting 
radicalism, especially through social media, can further be a rational-
technological effort to filter and attract followers who have the same 
level of understanding. On social media, the similarity of individual 
attributes, such as social, cultural, educational, religious, and ideological 
backgrounds, plays an important role in the process of social 
interaction. A number of studies on the phenomenon of ‘homophily’ 
has indicated that individuals with relatively similar attributes and 
characteristics tend to interact more easily with one another and share 
the same information.24 Social media users tend to be more receptive 
to information that is the same or by their beliefs, and more likely to 
join groups of which members have similar attributes or views as they 
do.25 
The similarity of individual attributes of social media users is 
further affirmed by what Eli Pariser calls the “filter bubble effect”.26 
Filter bubbles are artificial realities as a result of algorithms of search 
engine and social media platforms where internet users will tend to 
receive different information according to their profile, their location, 
their behavior in using the internet, and even according to their 
                                                                
23 McLuhan M., Understanding Media: The Extension of Man (New York: McGraw Hill, 
1964). 
24 Miller Mcpherson, Lynn Smith-lovin, and James M Cook, “Birds of a Feather: 
Homophily in Social Networks,” Annual Review of Sociology 27 (2001): 415–444; 
Munmun De Choudhury, Hari Sundaram, and Anjati John, Birds of a Feather: Does User 
Homophily Impact Information Diffusion in Social Media?, 2010. 
25 Choudhury, Sundaram, and John, Birds of a Feather: Does User Homophily Impact 
Information Diffusion in Social Media?". 
26 Eli Pariser, The Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding from You (New York: Penguin 
Pers, 2011). 
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browsing history. In the reality of this filter bubble, internet users with 
similar profile preferences will tend to receive the same information. 
On the contrary, internet users with different profile preferences will 
receive different information. As a result, the digital world has created 
bubbles that cause internet users to live by their profile, and their 
profile alone.    
On the one hand, because of bubble filters, internet users, 
especially social media ones, with the same attributes and profiles are 
more likely to receive the same information and join the same group.27 
On the other hand, people who are stuck in the bubble filter will find it 
difficult to receive information from social media users who have 
different individual attributes and profiles from them. Consequently, 
those who live in the reality of bubble filters will tend to reinforce any 
message or information received from the group. This is a 
phenomenon that is often referred to by media communication experts 
as the echo chamber effect.28 
The channelization strategy of radical-religious ideologies via new 
media is a networking process to find "birds of a feather" who are 
ideologically ready to fight for radical-religious organizations. In this 
context, it is interesting to take a look at the findings of Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt, as cited by Jackson,29 which have presented three structures 
of organizational communication networks in terrorist groups: chain 
network, where organizational units are connected sequentially in a row; 
hub and spoke network, where links to all units come out of one node; 
and all-channel network, where all units are connected to all others in the 
organization. 
Referring to the framework of network structure below (Figure 2), 
this study finds that channelization strategy of radical-religious 
ideologies via new media is more closely related to all-channel network 
than to chain network and hub and spoke network. More clearly, the actors 
of spreading radicalism in the channelization model have non-
                                                                
27 Mcpherson, Smith-lovin, and Cook, “Birds of a Feather”; Choudhury, Sundaram, 
and John, Birds of a Feather. 
28 Cass Sunstein, Republic.Com 2.0 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Seth 
Flaxman, Sharad Goel, and Justin Rao, “Filter Bubbles, Echo Chambers, and Online 
News Consumption,” Public Opinion Quarterly 80, no. S.1 (2016): 24–29. 
29 Brian A Jackson, “Groups, Networks, or Movements: A Command-and- Control-
Driven Approach to Classifying Terrorist Organizations and Its Application to Al 
Qaeda,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (2006): 37–41. 
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hierarchical characters that are connected to each other, even though 
the communication pattern is not fully democratic.  
 
Figure 2. Communication Network Structure of Terrorist Organization 
Furthermore, the channelization strategy model of radical 
ideologies via new media is also somewhat different from the network 
structure of Arquilla and Ronfeldt which tends to ignore selection 
processes of individuals who support radical ideology through 
different criteria and types of new media. Referring to the model found 
in this study, the process of disseminating radical-religious ideologies 
occurred through a mechanism of “spreading and filtering”, which 
aims to select and recruit new members, as well as to disseminate 
ideological teachings. Channelization of ideology which follows three 
stages—the open-public channel, the restricted-public channel, and the 
private channel—ultimately aims to attract new members to radical-
religious organizations that have the same ideological political view.  
 
Figure 3. Ideology Channelization Model via New Media 
The channelization strategy of radical ideologies developed by 
radical-religious organizations to attract new cadres can be analogous 
to “drainage” channel that gets narrower and directs the flow of 
information to the desired point (Figure 3). On the first channel, that is 
open-public channel, certain new public media that are popular and 
open such as blogs, video blogs, websites, and social media such as 
Facebook, Twitter, or Instagram, are used to disseminate ideological 
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messages to the broader audience. Consumers of the information on 
the first channel level are not restricted, meaning that the information 
can be accessed by anyone. 
On the restricted-public channel, new media used are fewer and 
the access is limited to their users. For example, Facebook groups or 
group conversation in Instagram are intentionally set as private groups. 
The consumer of information on this channel is limited and the 
information can only be accessed by those who have been approved to 
join the channel. On the private channel, the selection process is more 
stringent and closed. The types of social media that are widely used on 
this channel include Line, WhatsApp, and Telegram. Only those who 
want to become cadres of radical-religious organizations will receive 
information in private.  
In general, the channelization strategy of radical-religious 
ideologies is almost the same as the strategy implemented by several 
traditional Islamic organizations in Indonesia, such as NU and 
Muhammadiyah, to instill certain religious and ideological teachings by 
providing channels for early childhood education and higher 
education. However, a fundamental difference can be seen in the use 
of new media as a means of ideology dissemination and the goal of the 
channelization process. The channelization strategy of traditional 
Islamic education in Indonesia does not relatively utilize new media as 
the primary media for the spread of their teachings. In addition, 
channelization of traditional Islamic education in Indonesia does not 
have the goal of recruiting new cadres. Religious understanding taught 
in traditional Islamic educational institutions does not restrain their 
students from believing their respective religious ideologies. 
On the contrary, ideology channelization strategy of radical and 
transnational Islamic organizations in Indonesia such as HTI, 
KAMMI, JAD, Gema Pembebasan IPB, FPI, and other small groups of 
salafist and tarbiyah, purposely employs new media as the spearhead in 
distributing their ideology. Furthermore, this channelization strategy 
aims to attract new cadres. 
Conclusion 
The dissemination of radical-religious ideologies among Muslim 
students in Indonesia via new media occurs systematically and 
structurally. New media used in the dissemination of radicalism are 
blogs, pages, video blogs, forums, and social media. The distribution of 
radicalism among Muslim students in Indonesia employs 
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channelization strategy, which is a technique of making channels for 
structurally disseminating information and ideological teachings of 
radical-religious organizations via blogs, video blogs, pages, forums, 
and social media. Channelization may follow three stages, namely 
open-public channel (K-1), restricted-public channel (K-2), and private 
channel (K-3). 
This channelization is intentionally carried out and developed by 
radical groups to facilitate the process of transmitting radicalism 
through communication and coordination among members of radical-
religious organizations, and to recruit new cadres to their 
organizations. In contrast to the approach model that emphasizes the 
importance of widespread dissemination of ideology, ideology 
channelization via new media is consciously developed to deepen the 
beliefs of recruited cadres further so that they become more militant 
and radical and are always willing to defend radical ideology they have 
faith in. Not only expected to become passive consumers who 
regularly read various information on websites of organizations, 
students who have been indoctrinated by radicalism, and even involved 
in radical movements, are also expected to become prosumers who 
actively produce and recirculate messages of radicalism to other 
students and broader circles. [] 
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